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1 Introduction
The prisoner’s dilemma game has been extended in various ways to resolve the
dilemma. This note examines how a second chance, when provided to a disadvantaged
player, can resolve the prisoner’s dilemma. Kalai (1981) provides a preplay negotiation
procedure, which resolves the dilemma in a one-shot game. The current paper shows
that Kalai’s procedure can be substituted with the goal-directed behavior of the
“investigator” in our example.
2 The prisoner’s dilemma game with the second chance
Let us assume the payoff matrix given in Table 1. The story behind it is as usual: the
police investigate two suspects under arrest. The suspects committed a crime together,
but the available evidence is sufficient only for minor convictions. The estimated
penalties are 5 years in jail if both suspects confess, 2 years in jail if both refuse to
confess, and 1 year for one suspect and 10 years for the other, if the former confesses
while the latter refuses.
Table 1.
An extensive form representation
Figure 1 shows an extensive form representation of the above matrix. The subgame
perfect equilibrium of this game is characterized by confessions from both suspects
(Confess, Confess) and Pareto inefficient outcomes (-5, -5).
Suspect B
Su
sp
ect
A
Refuse Confess
Re
fus
e
-2, -2 -10, -1
Co
nfe
ss
-1, -10 -5, -5
Figure 1.
Now, suppose that the investigator in charge is well known to be a perfectionist, who
stubbornly seeks not just one, but all suspects’ confessions all the time; and that if one
suspect confesses, the investigator always provides a second chance to the other who
has refused to confess. The game tree is thus extended to the one in Figure 2, where the
red node and the yellow node are added as the second chances given to suspect A and
suspect B respectively.1
Figure 2.
1 At the stage of the red and yellow nodes, it would be rational for the investigator to
give a second chance, since it certainly leads to the suspect’s confession. However, if the
investigator attempts to give a second chance at the left terminal, it would bring the
situation back to where the game started.
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Then, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 1: Suppose that second chances are provided to disadvantaged players in
the extensive form prisoner’s dilemma game. Then, the subgame perfect equilibrium
becomes (Refuse, Refuse),2 and the pair of payoffs becomes (-2, -2), that is, Pareto
efficient one.
The investigator, who always seeks all suspects’ confessions, will be caught in a
dilemma.
Simultaneous action in the first stage
Let us consider a slightly modified case where these suspects make initial choices
simultaneously, and suppose that, after their choices have been made, a disadvantaged
suspect who has refused to confess is provided with a second chance, together with the
information of the other suspect’s confession. In this case, the payoff matrix evaluated
at the initial stage is given by Table 2. Then, we have the following proposition.
Table 2.
Proposition 2: Suppose that second chances are added to the simultaneous-move
prisoner’s dilemma game. Then, the pair of actions (Refuse, Refuse) is a weakly
dominant and trembling-hand perfect equilibrium.
2 At the gray node, “Refuse” and “Confess” are indifferent choices to suspect B, and
anyway, suspect A chooses “Refuse” at the root node.
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Thus, cooperative actions are very likely to happen.3
3 Conclusion
While many devices have been proposed for breaking the prisoner’s dilemma, the
simplest may be to give a second chance to the disadvantaged player placed in an
asymmetric payoff situation. Comparison between Table 1 and 2 sheds light on two
effects of the second chance. First, the second chance makes the choice of “Refuse” safer,
since a later revision becomes available when the other player chooses “Confess.”
Second, it makes the choice of “Confess” less attractive, since the other player can
change its action from “Refuse” to “Confess” later. The framework of the prisoner’s
dilemma with the second chance is expected to have a wide area of application.
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